



The Honorable the Lieutenant Governor in Council is pleased to direct that all Appointments, Orders and Notifications by Government, published in the *Java Government Gazette*, be considered as official, and duly attended to accordingly by the parties concerned. (Signed) C. G. BLGRAVE, Acting Secretary to Government. BATAVIA, February 1812.

Den Heere Luitenant Gouverneur heeft goedgevonden, te bepalen, dat alle de van wegens het Gouvernement in de *Javasche Gouvernements Courant*, geplaatst wordende Aanstellingen, Orders en Bekendmakingen, als Officiele moeten worden aangemerkt en by ieder als zoodanig moeten worden erkend. (Was getekend) C. G. BLGRAVE, Sec. Genl. BATAVIA, den February 1812.

VOL. II.]

BATAVIA, SATURDAY, JULY 3, 1813.

[NO. 71.]

## Publication.

IT being deemed advisable and beneficial to the mutual interests of the Government of Ceylon and of this Colony, that the commercial intercourse heretofore existing between them should be renewed, the Public are hereby informed that every possible indulgence and assistance will be given by both Governments to facilitate the same, and that Captain de Bussche, of His Majesty's 4th Ceylon Regiment, has arrived with authority from His Excellency the Governor to confer with such Merchants on this Island as may be disposed to engage in this commerce, and to acquaint them with the nature and conditions thereof.

Applications may be made to Captain de Bussche accordingly.

By order of the Honorable the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

C. ASSEY, Sec. to Govt.

BATAVIA, June 16, 1813.

## Publicatie.

NADEMAAL het voor de wederzydsche belangen van het Gouvernement van Ceylon en van deze volkplanting, raadzaam en voordelig geoordeeld wordt, dat de verhouding tusschen de beide Colonien bestaan hebbende handelsdryvende betrekkingen, hernieuwd worden, zoo wordt hiernaar aan het Publiek bekend gemaakt dat de beide Gouvernementsen alle mogelijke hulp verleen en alle in hikkelykheid zullen gebruiken, ten einde het bereiken van dit doel gemaklyk te maken—dat gien Kapitein de Bussche van Z. M. de Ceylonsche Regt, alhier is aangekomen met autorisatie van Zyne Excellentie de Gouverneur om te raadplegen met zodanige Kooplieden op dit Eiland als genegen mogten zyn om die handel te ondernemen, ten einde hun met den aart en de voorwaarden van denzelven bekend te maken.

De belanghebbenden kunnen zich ten dien einde by Capt. de Bussche melden.

Ter ordonnantie van den Heere Luitenant Gouverneur in Rade.

C. ASSEY, Sec. van het Govt.

BATAVIA, den 16 Juny 1813.

## NOTICE.

CAPTAIN de Bussche, of H. M. 4th Ceylon Regt, having arrived from Ceylon with authority from His Excellency the Governor to recruit for the Malay Regiment on that Island, the full permission of this Government for that Officer to recruit and to entertain Volunteers willing to engage for His Majesty's Service at Ceylon, is granted accordingly,—and notice is hereby given that the strict commercial intercourse about to be established between the two Colonies will so far unite their Interests that such men as are inclined to engage on the terms which Captain de Bussche will point out, will participate in the advantage of a constant intercourse with their country.

By Authority of the Honorable the Lieutenant Governor in Council

C. ASSEY, Sec. to Govt.

BATAVIA, June 16, 1813.

## BEKENDMAKING.

DEN Kapitein de Bussche van Z. M. 4de Ceylonsche Regt. van Ceylon alhier aangekomen zynde met autorisatie van Zyne Excellentie de Gouverneur om voor het aldaar bestaande Maleidsche Korps te werven, zo is aan gemelde Officier de toestemming van dit Gouvernement verleend tot het recruteren en aannemen van alle vrywilligers welke genegen mogten zyn om zich in Zyne Majesteit Dienst op Ceylon te begeven. Wordende tevens aan ieder hierby bekend gemaakt dat de handelsdryvende relatien welke eerlang tusschen de beide Volkplantingen zullen plaats grijpen, derzelver belangen in zo verre zullen vereenigen, dat alle manschappen welke zich zouden willen engageeren op de voorwaarden welke de Kapitein de Bussche hun zal bekend maken, het voordeel zullen genieten van een onafgebroken correspondentie met hun vaderland.

Op Autorisatie van de Heer Luitenant Gouverneur in Rade.

C. ASSEY, Sec. van 't Govt.

BATAVIA, don 16de Juny 1813.

## Notice.

THE public are hereby informed that the Stamps will in future be signed by one of the Members of the European Orphan Chamber instead of being signed as heretofore by a Commissioner of the Court of Requests.

C. ASSEY,

Secretary to Government.

BATAVIA, June 22, 1813.

## Bekendmaking.

WORDT hiernede bekend gemaakt dat de zegels in het vervolg zullen geparaapheert worden door een der Leden van de Weeskamer in stede van een Commissaris van het Request Hof zo als tot nu toe is geschiedt.

C. ASSEY,

Sec. van het Govt.

BATAVIA, den 22 Juny 1813.

## BATAVIAASCH GENOOTSCHAP.

DE eerstkomende Algemeene Vergadering blyft uitgesteld tot Maandag den 2den, Augustus aanstaande, gewoner uur ten Gouvernements huize.

Batavia, den 2 July 1813.

J. Th. Ross, Secretaris.

## Advertentie.

ALLE Eigenaars of Voerders van A Praauwen, Chiampangs, Tjunias, Boemals en andere, op 't oogenst Vaartuygen sorteerende onder het opzigt van het Hoofd der Praauw-voerders, als meede de Eigenaars van Chiampangs, dewelke gepermitteerd zyn, om de Producten van haar Landeryen aftehaalen, werden by deelen geadvertiseerd dat op Zaterdag den 28ste Augustus aanstaande de Jaarlyksche Monsterring over voormelde Vaartuygen zal geschieden by de Hout-kap; en dat zy zig van heeden af kunnen begeven by den Nummer der Vaartuygen *Huyzers*, om haare Vaartuygen te laten Nummeren of Merken, desgelyks worden alle de Eysgenars of Voerders van ongenommerde Praauwen van wat maakzel dezelve ook zyn, en zonder onderscheid of dezelve hun in Eygendom toebehooren of dat zy die huur hebben, Conform Articul 1, 2, en 3, vande Ordonnantie voor het Veer, en het jongst Besluit van het voormalige Collegie van Scheepenen dezer Steede de dato 28 April des Jaars 1783, gelast en geordonneerd, dat zy lieden zig almeede van heeden af moeten vervoegen by bovengemelde Nummer, om haare Vaartuygen te Nummeren, en met het gewoone Merk te doen branden, wyders worden de gezamentlyke Araks-branders, Kalk-branders, Steen en Panne-bakkers almeede by deese geadvertiseerd, om ingevolge Besluit van het voormalige Gouvernement van den 11 Augustus 1786, in de Maanden July en Augustus hunne Chiampangs en Joekoengs te doen brengen by gemelde Nummer, dan wel den zelve te ontbieden ter plaatse waar hunne Vaartuygen leggen, als meede om volgens de Order genominert en gemerkt te worden op poene dat wie daar aan bevonden zal worden nalatig of onwillig te zyn, en dezelve zonder Nummer of Letter employeert, zal vervallen in de Boctens by voormelde Ordonnantie gestatueert.

Batavia den 1ste July 1813.

## Advertentie.

DIE its te vorderen hebben van dan wel schuldig zyn aan den boedel van wylen Mevrouw van Haak, worden verzocht daarvan opgave te doen binnen den tyd van 14 dagen aan den ondergetekende Testamentaire Exeuteur wonende by den Heer H. L. Senn van Basel, op Molen-vliet.

BATAVIA den 3 July 1813.

VAN HAAK.

## Advertisement.

THE President and Members of the European Orphan Chamber, hereby give public notice to all concerned, that they have been directed by Government to take upon themselves the trust of Administrators to the Estate of the late Captain Watling, deceased, and as such, they request all persons who have any demands upon the Estate of the said deceased, to bring in the same, and those who are indebted thereto, to make payment with the least possible delay to their Register.

J. H. DE HOOGH, Register.

BATAVIA, June 15, 1813.

## Advertentie.

PRESIDENT en Leden van het Collegie van Weesmeesteren alhier maken mits dezen aan alle en een iegelyk bekend dat zy van wege het Gouvernement gelast zyn geworden om de administratie van de Boedel en Nalatenschap van wylen den Overledenen Capitein WATLING op zich te nemen, verzoeken derhalven alle de geenen, die enige pretentie hebben op de gemelde Nalatenschap, om hunne rekeningen intezenden, en de geenen die daar aan iets debet mogten zyn, om betaling daarvan te doen, zo spoedig mogelyk aan hunne Secretaris.

Batavia den 15de Juny 1813. J. H. de Hoogh, Sec.

## Advertisement.

ALL Persons having any claim on the Estate of the late Lieut. Colonel JAMES FRASER, of His Majesty's 78th Regiment of Foot, or who may be indebted thereto, are requested to send in their claims, or pay their debts to Col. ADAMS or Major FORBES, of the said Regiment, the Executors named in the last Will of the Deceased.

## FOR SALE

At No. 31, Little Malacca-Street, THE BEST

## MASULAPATAM SNUFF

In Bottles, WELL PRESERVED, BY MR. JOS. STEVENS.

## Advertentie.

DAAR is gevonden een zwart klein Paard, dat ter hand gesteld zal worden, aan die geen die bewys van eigendom van hetzelfde zal kunnen geven aan de Magistraat van de Bataviasche Ommelanden *Smissaart*, mits betalende de onkosten van dit advertissement en onderhoud van het Paard.

## Advertentie.

DE geene die iets te pretenderen hebben, ofte schuldig zyn aan den Heere J. Sluyter, of den tekenaar gelieve daar van binne twee Maande opgave of beaaltig te doen.

M. D. BURKENS.

EENIGE HOLLANDSCHE ALMANAKKEN, VOOR HET LOPENDE JAAR Zyn op de LANDS Druk-kery te bekomen.

AN ASSORTMENT OF BLANK BOOKS,

MAY BE HAD AT THE GAZETTE OFFICE.

## FOR SALE

BY M. GROENEWALD & Co.

COW STREET, SPICES of sorts, best Port wine, Brandy and other Spirits &c. in small quantities.

## Advertentie.

BY Groenewald in Compagnie is by kleine quantiteiten, te bekomen, Speceryen in soorten, benevens goede Brandewyn, Portwyn, en andere Dranken en wesmeer.

## Advertisement.

J. ADRIAANSEN, Great River Street, offers for sale, the Good Ship *Hoop Hersteld* lying in Batavia Roads, where she can be seen.

## Advertentie.

J. ADRIAANSEN, op 't Groot Rivier Presenteerd uit de hand te Koop een wel gebouwd Schip genaamd *Op Hoop Hersteld*, leggende ter Rheede van Batavia, kunnende Daagelyks door een ider bezigtigd worden.

## FOR SALE,

A beautiful Collection of

SHELLS AND CURIOSITIES,

By Mr. DOMBURG, Attorney,

AT SAMARANG.

## Advertentie.

ALLE de geene die iets te pretendeeren hebben van, dan wel schuldig zyn aan den Boedel van wylen E. C. Brandis, gelieve daar van opgave te doen aan den mede Exeuteur in gemelde boedel F. P. Seena, binnen de tyd van een Maand gerekend van de eerste plaatsing deeses tot den 3de Augustus 1813.

## Advertentie.

ALLE de geene die iets te pretenderen hebben van, dan wel verschuldigd zyn aan den boedel van wylen J. Karseboom, gelieve daar van binnen den tyd van een Maand opgave te doen aan H. Simons.

HEDEN beviel myne Echtgenote voorspoedig van een Dochter.

SOURABAYA den 17de Juny 1813. JACOBUS DE BRUYN.

DE dag van den 24 der vorige maand gaf aan de Oud Hollandsche Ingezeeten van Batavia en dies omtrek stoffe tot de herinnering, hoe aangenaam en plegtelyk het is dankbaar te zyn aan weldaden en gunstbewyzen van de oppermagt genoten;—voor al dan, (zo als hier het geval was :) indien de harten vervuld zyn met de overtuiging, dat dezelve geen andere begiuselen of beweeg redenen, als die van Edelmoedigheid, menschenliefde en belangloosheid ten grondslag hadden.

Deze dag, volgens de bekendmaking van den 19. bevorens bepaald zynde, tot de byeenkomst der respectabele Ingezeeten van Batavia en dies omtrek ten Stadhuize, ten einde in overweeing te nemen een adres aan Zyn Excellentie den Hoog Edel Geboren Heere, Lord MINTO, Gouverneur Generaal van Britsch Indien, kwam een aanzienlyk getal derzelven ten bepaalde ure by een.

Het Comité dat zich zo wel met de directie van dit met de geest dier Ingezeeten overeenstemmend voornemen, als met het adres hadt gechargeert, en vermeld is in gem: Courant van den 19 der afgelopen Maand, hadt zich bevoorens naar de tot deze plegtigheid in ge-





## SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

ARRIVALS.] June 25.—Ship Experiment, C. Walker, from China 6th May.—Cargo, Sundries.—Passengers, Messrs. D. Goedbloed and J. Ross.

Same day—Brig Maria, Williams, from Malacca 2nd May.—Passenger, Mr. B. Mansel.

Same day—H. C. Gun-boat No. 3, A. Heebers, from Bantam.

June 27.—H. C. ship Apollo, C. B. Tabbitt, from Amboyna.

June 29.—Ship Ceres, J. C. Smith, from Samarang 25th June—Cargo, Timber—Passengers, Mr. Assist. Surgeon A. Murray, and a Detachment of the Royal Artillery.

June 30.—Chinese brig San Hincleo, Kiong Saling, from Banjer Masin 13th June—Cargo, Sundries.

Same day—Malay brig Commalay, Harris, from Banjer Masin 15th June—Cargo, Sundries.

July 1.—Ship Cato, Henry Brown, from Tagal 28th June—Cargo, Rice.

Same day—Brig Jane, E. Kapanberg, from Banjer Masin 16th June—Cargo, Sundries.

DEPARTURES.] June 28.—Brig Lottery, J. Abraham, for Tagal.

Same day.—H. C. brig Mary Ann, N. Buchanan, for Banjer Masin.

Do.—Ship Indian, A. Barclay, for China.

June 29.—Brig Erstezoon, J. B. Pypers, for Tagal.

Same day—Do. Anna Margaretha, J. B. Balles, for Tagal.

Same day—Brig Tay, P. C. Foster, for Bencoolen and Malacca.

July 2.—Malay brig Josephina, Kassem, for Tagal.

### Vessels lying in Batavia Roads.

H. C. ship Apollo—Ship Good Hope—do. Perseverance—do. Ceres—do. Cato—do. Experiment—H. C. Gun-boat, No. 3—brig Jane—do. Maria—do. Emelie—do. Scarpard—do. Gesma—do. Hendrik—Arab brig Selayhor—Malay brig Commalay.

### BIRTH.

On Saturday the 28th ultimo, the Lady of W. Barrett, Esq. of a Son.

### DEATHS.

On Monday the 28th ultimo, Mrs. van Haak.  
On Tuesday the 29th do. Mr. E. C. Brandis.

## UNITED PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

### HOUSE OF LORDS, Nov. 30.

The doors of the House were opened about eleven o'clock, and soon afterwards a great number of ladies superbly dressed occupied the Peers' seats. In the course of little more than an hour the House was excessively crowded.

About one o'clock the Lord Chancellor came in and prayers were read.

The oaths were administered to several Lords at the table.

About five minutes before two, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent entered the House in state and took his seat upon the Throne, attired in his robes and wearing a drest hat.

Sir Thomas Tyrwhitt was sent to the Commons to command their attendance.

The Speaker and a great number of Members having come to the bar, his Royal Highness the Prince Regent delivered from the Throne the following Speech:

#### My Lords and Gentlemen,

"It is with the deepest concern that I am obliged to announce to you, at the opening of this Parliament, the continuance of his Majesty's lamented indisposition, and the diminution of the hopes which I have most anxiously entertained of his recovery.

"The situation of public affairs has induced me to take the earliest opportunity of meeting you after the late Elections. I am persuaded you will cordially participate in the satisfaction which I derive from the improvement of our prospects during the course of the present year.

"The valour and intrepidity displayed by His Majesty's forces and those of his Allies in the Peninsula, on so many occasions during this campaign, and the consummate skill and judgment with which the operations have been conducted by General the Marquis of Wellington, have led to consequences of the utmost importance to the common cause.

"By transferring the war into the interior of Spain, and by the glorious and ever memorable victory obtained at Salamanca, he has compelled the enemy to raise the siege of Cadiz, and the Southern Provinces of that kingdom have been delivered from the power and arms of France.

"Although I cannot but regret that the efforts of the enemy, combined with a view to one great operation, have rendered it necessary to withdraw from the siege of Burgos, and to evacuate Madrid, for the purpose of concentrating the main body of the allied forces;

these efforts of the enemy have, nevertheless, been attended with important sacrifices on their part, which must materially contribute to extend the resources and facilitate the exertions of the Spanish nation.

"I am confident I may rely on your determination to continue to afford every aid in support of a contest which has first given to the Continent of Europe the example of persevering and successful resistance to the power of France, and on which not only the independence of the nations of the Peninsula, but the best interests of his Majesty's dominions essentially depend.

"I have great pleasure in communicating to you, that the relations of peace and friendship have been restored between His Majesty and the Courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm.

"I have directed copies of the treaties to be laid before you.

"In a contest for his own sovereign rights, and for the independence of his dominions, the Emperor of Russia has had to oppose a large proportion of the military power of the French Government, assisted by its Allies and by the tributary States dependent upon it.

"The resistance which he has opposed to so formidable a combination cannot fail to excite sentiments of lasting admiration.

"By his own magnanimity and perseverance, by the zeal and disinterestedness of all ranks of his subjects, and by the gallantry, firmness, and intrepidity of his forces, the presumptuous expectations of the enemy have been signally disappointed.

"The enthusiasm of the Russian nation has increased with the difficulties of the contest, and with the dangers with which they were surrounded. They have submitted to sacrifices of which there are few examples in the history of the world; and I indulge the confident hope, that the determined perseverance of his Imperial Majesty will be crowned with ultimate success; and that this contest in its result will have the effect of establishing, upon a foundation never to be shaken, the security and independence of the Russian Empire.

"The proof of confidence which I have received from his Imperial Majesty in the measure which he has adopted of sending his fleets to the ports of this country, is in the highest degree gratifying to me, and his Imperial Majesty may most fully rely on my fixed determination to afford him the most cordial support in the great contest in which he is engaged.

"I have the satisfaction further to acquaint you, that I have concluded a Treaty with his Sicilian Majesty, supplementary to the Treaties of 1808 and 1809.

"As soon as the Ratifications shall have been exchanged, I will direct a Copy of this Treaty to be laid before you.

"My object has been to provide for the more extensive application of the military force of the Sicilian Government to offensive operations; a measure, which combined with the liberal and enlightened principles which happily prevail in the Councils of his Sicilian Majesty, is calculated, I trust, to augment his power and resources, and at the same time to render them essentially serviceable to the common cause.

"The Declaration of War by the Government of the United States of America was made under circumstances which might have afforded a reasonable expectation that the amicable relations between the two nations would not be interrupted. It is with sincere regret that I am obliged to acquaint you, that the conduct and pretensions of that Government has hitherto prevented the conclusion of any pacific arrangement.

"Their measures of hostility have been principally directed against the adjoining British Provinces, and every effort has been made to seduce the inhabitants of them from their allegiance to his Majesty.

"The proofs, however, which I have received of loyalty and attachment from his Majesty's subjects in North America are highly satisfactory.

"The attempts of the enemy to invade Upper Canada have not only proved abortive, but by the judicious arrangements of the Governor General, and by the skill and decision with which the military operations have been conducted, the forces of the enemy assembled for that purpose in one quarter have been compelled to capitulate, and in another have been completely defeated.

"My best efforts are not wanting for the restoration of the relations of peace and amity between the two countries; but until this object can be attained without sacrificing the maritime rights of Great Britain, I shall rely upon your cordial support in a vigorous prosecution of the war.

#### Gentlemen of the House of Commons,

"I have directed the Estimates for the services of the ensuing year to be laid before you, and I entertain no doubt of your readiness to furnish such supplies as may enable me to provide for the great interests committed to my charge, and to afford the best prospect of bringing the contest in which his Majesty is engaged to a successful termination."

#### My Lords and Gentlemen,

"The approaching expiration of the Charter of the East India Company, renders it necessary that I should call your early attention to the propriety of providing effectually for the future Government of the provinces of India.

"In considering the variety of interests which are connected with this important subject, I rely on your wisdom for making such an arrangement as may best promote the prosperity of the British possessions in that quarter, and at the same time secure the greatest advantages to the commerce and revenue of His Majesty's dominions.

"I have derived great satisfaction from the success of the measures which have been adopted for suppressing the spirit of Outrage and Insubordination which had appeared in some parts of the Country, and from the disposition which has been manifested to take advantage of the indemnity held out to the deluded by the wisdom and benevolence of Parliament.

"I trust I shall never have occasion to lament the recurrence of atrocities so repugnant to the British character, and that all his Majesty's subjects will be impressed with the conviction, that the happiness of individuals and the welfare of the state equally depend upon strict obedience to the laws, and attachment to our excellent Constitution.

"In the loyalty of his Majesty's people, and in the wisdom of Parliament, I have reason to place the fullest confidence. The same firmness and perseverance which have been manifested on so many and such trying occasions, will not, I am persuaded, be wanting at a time when the eyes of all Europe, and of the world, are fixed upon you. I can assure you, that in the exercise of the great trust reposed in me, I have no sentiment so near my heart as the desire to promote, by every means in my power, the real prosperity and lasting happiness of his Majesty's subjects."

The Commons withdrew, and his Royal Highness retired from the House with the same state as on his entrance.

The House adjourned during pleasure, and at a quarter past five proceeded to business.

The Lord Chancellor read to the House the Speech delivered by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, which was also again read by the Clerk at the table.

The Earl of Longford rose to move the address, not merely his Lordship observed, in compliance with the customary form upon such occasions, but as really feeling that improvement in our prospects, since the last Session, to which the Speech of his Royal Highness adverted. No man could more deeply deplore than himself the continuance of his Majesty's afflicting indisposition, or the diminished probability of his recovery, but it was a decree which it was impossible to resist, and to which, therefore, they must submit. On the subject of the war in the Peninsula, he felt the utmost satisfaction in contemplating the general state of the campaign since the last Session, and the highest gratification in doing justice to the merits of General the Marquis of Wellington. The skill and talents displayed by that Commander, in the conduct of the campaign, could not fail to be a source of pride and high gratification to his countrymen, to his connections and friends. In thus giving that meed of praise, which the eminent services of Lord Wellington so justly demanded, he was only echoing the general voice, only coinciding with that general opinion, which had already pronounced upon his merits. And this opinion not taken up hastily from the mere brilliancy of temporary success, but adopted

in that Noble Commander a series of painful exertions, after observing in him, through a long course of service, vigour of conception, wisdom and sagacity of plan, and promptitude and energy in execution. It was after witnessing the eminent display of all those qualifications and the results, proving the judgment and sagacity of him who planned them, and his ability in executing the plans he had formed, that the public voice decidedly and justly pronounced Wellington a hero. In looking to the state of the campaign, they had seen the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Badajoz, and the victory of Salamanca, the fruits of Lord Wellington's skilful combinations, and the results of which was the compelling the enemy to raise the siege of Cadiz and to evacuate the southern provinces of Spain. It was true that our hopes respecting Burgos had not been realized, that the siege of that place had been raised, and that the enemy had been enabled to concentrate their forces. But in the retrograde movement of our army, in consequence of these events, he saw no ground for apprehension. On a former occasion, when the enemy had concentrated their troops, they were, from the difficulties of their situation, soon obliged to separate, and they had seen that when, after the capture of Badajoz, that event was not immediately followed by all the advantages expected from it, but that Lord Wellington was obliged to retrograde, they had seen that he immediately formed new plans, and turned the circumstances that had, unfavourable as they at first appeared, to the discomfiture of the enemy. Judging, therefore, from the circumstances that had occurred, they might reasonably conclude that the same skill and ability would be directed to the formation of new plans, for the defeat of the projects of the enemy, in the results of which they might confidently anticipate success. It was to be lamented, that a disobedience of orders should have given the means to the enemy of more securely and boldly concentrating their troops; but that disobedience had been attended with

sion, and it was not necessary now to say any more upon the subject. What might be the effect of another separation of the enemy's troops, he should not now attempt to anticipate, confident in the sagacity and judgment which would be evinced in counteracting their plans. The effect of our successes in the Peninsula had not been confined to this country, they had procured a most beneficial effect in the remotest part of Europe; they had not only kept employed a considerable number of those troops of the enemy which would otherwise have been added to his already enormous force in Russia, but they had also produced a more advantageous effect in Russia, in giving a greater animation to the resistance against the ambitious tyranny of the Ruler of France. The Emperor of Russia had evinced his firm determination not to submit to the yoke attempted to be imposed upon him, and was seconded by the united efforts of his people. The distraction and desolation which had been resorted to, however painful in the contemplation, had produced the effect of deranging the projects of the enemy, and there was every reason now to believe that his plans would be effectually counteracted. His Imperial Majesty had, at the same time, afforded the greatest proof of friendship and of his confidence in our honour and faith, in sending his fleets to our ports. The new treaty with Sweden was highly satisfactory, as affording the proof of amity with that power; and the new treaty with Sicily was also advantageous to the interests of the country. How then appeared the aspect of affairs since the commencement of the year? at that period nearly all Europe was arranged against us, and more than half that Continent was not merely in amity with us, but in active co-operation against the common enemy. Instead of that enemy threatening these islands with his force, he found it difficult to procure either from his tributary states, dignified with the name of allies, or from France itself, the necessary reinforcements to recruit his army in Russia. We must necessarily endure privations, and make sacrifices, in order to keep up the contest in which we are engaged; but far better was it to do that than to yield to an enemy whose projects aimed at nothing less than our destruction. These projects had now been in a great measure counteracted, and perseverance on our part was demanded by every consideration of our honour, our interest, and our welfare. Those privations, and those sacrifices, were as nothing, compared with the situation of these countries ravaged by an enemy's army, or when made the of seat war by two conflicting armies. He would not now advert to the prediction of some Members of that House, that no man of our army would remain in the Peninsula, except as a prisoner; he need only refer to the events that had occurred, to shew the futility of these predictions, and the reliance that was to be placed upon the skill and ability of our General, to dissipate any seeming difficulties, and finally to counteract the projects of the enemy. With regard to the United States of America, the declaration of war on their part had been made, under circumstances which led to a hope that the differences between the two nations might be speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. They had however since evinced a determination to attack the British possessions in North America, but in two attempts had been completely defeated. He admitted that a loss had been sustained in the capture of one of our frigates, but it was a loss, which in itself of little importance, had derived all the importance attached to it, from the rarity, thank God, of any naval loss on our part. The circumstance, however, might be attributed to the expectation, that the war would not be persisted in by the United States, and therefore that force was not sent out thither which would have been, had it been supposed that the war would have been continued. He trusted, however, that conciliation might still speedily take place without compromising our interests, or if that unfortunately could not take place, that the war would be carried on with adequate vigour. With respect to the renewal of the Charter of the East India Company, the Speech explained sufficiently the object in view, and it would be unnecessary for him to say more upon the subject. With regard to the discontents that had existed, deploring, as he did, the delusions that had prevailed in some parts of the country, he viewed with satisfaction the return of tranquillity, and was highly gratified to observe the beneficial effects of the indemnity granted by the Act of last Session, which had tended so speedily to bring back to loyalty and duty, many of those who had been deluded into error, and had mainly contributed to the restoration of that tranquillity which was so earnestly to be desired. He trusted that atrocities would never again be witnessed which were so new in the history of this country, and that the examples which had been made, and the clemency which had followed them would prevent their renewal. He wished to see justice thus administered in clemency, in consonance with the spirit of our excellent Constitution—a Constitution which needed only to be known to be admired, under which equal rights were enjoyed, and justice equally administered to the lowest and to the highest, to which the highest were equally amenable with the lowest. His Lordship concluded by moving an Address, embracing, as usual, the different topics of the Session.

Lord Rolle seconded the Address. His Lordship spoke in so low a tone of voice, that it was scarcely possible below the Bar to hear what he said. We understood him to speak in terms of warm eulogium of the affectionate conduct of the Prince Regent towards his father and the Royal Family. His Lordship also adverted to the Peninsula, praising the conduct of the campaign there, and to Russia, eulogizing the efforts made by the Emperor, and his people! and with respect to the United States of America, he trusted that we should not surrender our maritime rights, which were the main pillar of our strength. With respect to the disturbances, he had been witness to the beneficial effects of the indemnity provided by the Act of the last Session, and was satisfied that it had produced the most advantageous results in the restoration of tranquillity.

The Marquis Wellesley said, he could not have approved either of the Speech, or of the Address, had they, with respect to the great contest in the Peninsula, or the cause in which the Emperor of Russia was now engaged, with all the efforts of the people, assumed in any degree a lower tone than that which pervaded them. Nothing less was demanded by the great interests of the country, by a proper zeal for our honour or our welfare, or by a true regard to the interests of our allies embarked in the same great cause with ourselves. In all those points he not only applauded the spirit of the Speech, but he almost entirely approved of the general spirit of the Address moved and seconded by his Noble friends. Of all the parts of the Speech, however, none struck him more forcibly, none made a greater impression upon his mind, than that which anticipated the same wisdom in Parliament, the same firmness, and the same prudence, on the present trying occasion, when the eyes of all Europe, nay, of the whole world, were fixed upon us. There was nothing novel, he admitted, either in the subjects, or the expressions:—the novelty was rather in the application of them. Yes! he had, no doubt, the Parliament would exercise the same wisdom, it would exercise the same perseverance, it would display the same firmness, especially on the great question of the war in the Peninsula, as it had hitherto shewn. It was to that country in particular he wished to direct their Lordships' attention for a few moments. Its situation was to be considered in various respects; but in no respect would any man venture to say, that the triumphs which had been achieved there were of a description as to be totally unqualified; no man could say that victory had so predominated, that its career was unchecked by a single reverse. But, as it was certainly the highest part of the character of wisdom to persevere with reasonable grounds of hope, in the face of danger, difficulty and discomfiture, so it was the highest character of firmness to meet the tide of success without intoxication, to look it steadily in the face, to analyze the grounds upon which it stood, and from that analysis carefully and cautiously pursued, to deduce one general and consistent ground of public action. Even if our success had been broad, general, splendid and unqualified, he would say to those who represented a wise and enlightened nation, to those who were prepared and anxious to do their duty—be not not led away by this success—be not intoxicated with it—let not its lustre so dazzle your faculties that you perceive neither whence it originated, how it may be rendered permanent, nor to what ultimate objects it may be applied. And this he would say, not for the purpose of disparaging that success, not to raise any spirit of discontent, but for the sole purpose of producing a due tone of reflection, from which might spring one consistent, one general line of public conduct. We had, indeed, done much in Spain: he was most willing to admit it; but, he would ask, what still remained to be done; and that question naturally led him to a review of the events which had taken place there since no very distant period: he would limit himself to the time when Lord Wellington was before Badajoz. It had always appeared to him, from the very commencement of the struggle in the Peninsula, that the only solid ground of success, the only reasonable hope of that success, the only practical system of resistance which could be adopted, was to awaken in the people a spirit of hostility to France, and to succour and aid that hostility upon a broad and extensive scale of operations. In that way great advantages might be expected. It was, indeed, perfectly clear, that the measureless ambition of the Leader of France never would desist from its object, till some strong and energetic force should check its progress on the one side or other. If the Spanish nation could once bring themselves to feel that there was no evil, no human evil, scarcely indeed an evil beyond the verge of humanity, to be put in competition for a moment with that of submission to the Government of France; that loss of property, loss of relations, loss of all that was dear to them, compared to that tremendous and overwhelming calamity—submission to France; if they could be brought to that pitch of patriotism and resistance, every thing might then be hoped for from the contest. It was true, indeed, that the perseverance he had described was a species of which philosophy afforded no definition, nor history any record; but it was by that spirit alone that any thing great could be

achieved in the struggle between Spain and France. Our assistance in co-operating with this general feeling, might then have been productive of the greatest benefits. The great person who now rules over the destinies of France (for great he could not hesitate to call him) would then, it might be presumed, find himself, by the success of our arms, reduced to the necessity of abandoning the cause, or, his ambition exciting other enemies in other parts of Europe, who would be eager to seize the opportunity of his reverses in Spain, to shake off the yoke of his subjugation, he would be compelled to divide his forces, and thus present an easier prospect of success to our combined efforts in the Peninsula. Such was the view he had always taken of the contest in Spain; and with regard to the spirit of universal hostility in the people which he deemed so essential, he would assert, without fear of contradiction, it had been produced in its fullest extent in the course of last year. He was not speaking of any thing which it might be thought he had no liberty to express: he was not alluding to any thing which had come to his knowledge merely through an official channel: he asserted only what every one might know, who had directed his attention to what had occurred in the Peninsula during that period. He knew it also, as a fact which no one would venture to deny, that the success of the British arms in Spain had been felt and considered in Russia, as the salvation of the country, for if it had not been for our triumphs there, the Leader of France would have been able to direct such a vast military force against Russia, as she could not have resisted with any prospect of success. But, was not all this foreseen, and was not this the very basis on which the system to be pursued in our present situation should be founded? What then followed from the fact? The moment it was known that such efforts were taking place; the moment it was known that the desired action was commencing on the one side, ought we not to have pushed every effort on the other side, ought we not to have strained all the resources of the country, he would say to their very utmost; and if we were honest in our exertions in behalf of the cause, ought we not to have seized this momentous crisis as it occurred, to strike one grand and decisive blow? (*Hear, hear, hear!*) In these preliminary views of the question, which he had ventured to offer to their Lordships, his great purpose was to inquire, and to instigate their Lordships to inquire, whether the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles, whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been employed; and whether, upon the whole, the result had been such as the nation had a right to expect, from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He could wish also, that it were possible to fix in the minds of their Lordships something like a definite and precise object as to the contest in the Peninsula. His own idea as to the only true and legitimate object of that contest was the expulsion of the French armies from Spain: that he considered as the plain and practical object: it was intelligible to all, and he would detain their Lordships a few moments while he inquired what had been done in the course of the present year, towards the accomplishment of this object, compared to what might have been done if our resources had been properly employed. His opinion decidedly was, that the war in the Peninsula had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result which he had stated as the only true and practical one of the contest. He would carry his inquiries back (and he hoped with as much brevity as possible) to the period a little before the reduction of Badajoz, somewhere about the beginning of April last. At that time the great General who commands our armies in Spain having reduced that important fortress, his next step, it was natural to suppose, especially at that season of the year, would be to expel the French from the South of Spain. But why did he not do so? Because his resources were deficient; because he was under the necessity of abandoning his object, that of marching against Soult, and raising the siege of Cadiz, from inadequate means; and he was obliged to march northward with his army, because in the North of Spain he had no force sufficient to resist the progress of Marmont. He repaired accordingly to the North, and there he was under the necessity of remaining on the frontiers of Spain till the 13th of June, and by that time Marmont's army was in such a state that it became doubtful whether he could advance or not. But why did he remain so long? Because his means of advancing were insufficient; because he wanted money and supplies of every sort; because he had not the common means of transport to convey his artillery. These were the facts which he defined any one to contradict. At last, however, Lord Wellington advanced without a battering train, because he thought it necessary for the success of his military operations, but because he really had not the means of transporting his guns. But then, after Lord Wellington did advance, what state was he in? He found Marmont's army much stronger than he expected: that he found also another circumstance which disconcerted him in advancing (and here he begged leave to assert that he spoke

from no other knowledge of Lord Wellington's plans than what any person might acquire who had attentively watched the whole course of the proceedings in Spain—for not one syllable concerning them did he derive from any communication with that great General on the subject)—his object in advancing was, he maintained, in expectation of a powerful co-operation on the other side of the Peninsula, and which co-operation had been concerted with him even at the time he was before Badajoz. He, therefore, must have expected the assistance of this force at the time of his advance into Spain; for, had he not so expected it, he would venture to say that his advance into that country would have been unjustifiable, even tho' success had ultimately attended his progress. It was certain, however, that he remained a considerable time on the frontier, waiting for intelligence of the expected arrival of this co-operating force; but waiting in vain, he proceeded forward, still confident in his hope that it would arrive, and found Marmont's army much greater than he expected. Nor was that all he found: he found that Suchet had detached a corps to unite with Joseph's army, and which made his force efficient to co-operate with Marmont's army. What was the consequence? On the 17th July, five days before the battle of Salamanca, Lord Wellington commenced not a feigned, but a real retreat and this retreat he continued during the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and till late in the day of the 22d.—But why did he retreat? Why did this great General retreat? Because, again, his means were inadequate. (*Hear, hear, hear!*) He had no money: he was so low in money that he had not 20,000 dollars in his military chest. The richest brigade in the army did not possess more than 3000 dollars; and what were the only means left to this deserted General to recruit his finances? Forty thousand dollars had been sent to Cadiz, for the use of the Spaniards; these he was forced to intercept, and apply to the exigencies of the British army. Upon a fair comparison of his force with that of Marmont, and taking into calculation the reinforcement of Joseph's army by the detachment from Suchet, which detachment he had been unable to spare, if the Sicilian expedition had arrived in due time on the eastern coast of Spain, as it would have fully occupied his whole army, Lord Wellington deemed it most prudent to retreat, and he accordingly did so. Here he would request their Lordships to pause for a moment. Here was a proof of Lord Wellington's inadequacy of means. He retreated; and in ascribing that retreat to a want of resources, he was borrowing nothing from his imagination. The cause and effect were plain before them; and he might reason upon the subject, either from the cause to the effect, or from the effect to the cause. He might shew that his means were inadequate, and therefore he was compelled to retreat, or he might argue from the fact of the retreat, that he wanted the power to pursue his operations: and this deficiency of power arose chiefly, if not entirely, from the tardy and inefficient co-operation of the Sicilian expedition.

The next step in tracing the progress of Lord Wellington, brought him to a period full of glory and renown, he meant the battle of Salamanca. But what did that battle arise from? Did it arise out of his efficiency, or out of his necessity? It arose from the magnificence, the splendor, the greatness of the cause. He saw an opening—(*Hear, hear!*)—but he was to hope for that again—Was that a ground to build upon? His talents, indeed, were a firm and secure rock on which any hopes, any expectations, however great, however exalted, might be founded—(*Hear, hear!*) Did the Ministry mean to say that their system was raised solely upon the resplendent abilities of a consummate General, and upon the errors of the enemy? Did they mean to affirm that all their plans amounted only to that? The battle of Salamanca was certainly productive of great events; the evacuation of the South of Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the occupation of Madrid by our troops. But did it secure those advantages? Did they remain permanent? Was Lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont?—No.—He was not able to do that, which so obviously he ought to have done, because Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, was hanging on his flank, and afterwards on his rear. It was necessary to disperse that army. He did so, and entered Madrid. Could he then march Southward to pursue the career of his conquests? No. He found that the corps which he had so lately defeated, the army over which he had so recently triumphed, was strong again, and he was compelled to direct his course to the North once more, to meet them. Then followed the siege of Burgos, and all he should say upon that subject was, that so far from considering as a disappointment the failure of Lord Wellington in his attempt to reduce that fortress—it was madness to suppose that a fortress of such a description could be reduced by a few guns. He could not conceive, indeed, how any calculation founded upon success could be entertained, when Lord Wellington's means were confessedly inadequate according to all the established rules of war.

Again, when it was understood, as far back as the month of June last, that Lord

Wellington was advancing into Spain, was it possible not to see that France, being engaged in a war with Russia, must necessarily detach a great part of her force to that quarter of Europe, and that then was the moment, not only in reference to that event, but also to the terms of the Spanish nation, to send out sufficient reinforcements to enable Lord Wellington to proceed upon a large and effective scale of operations? Without such reinforcements it was manifestly imprudent to advance into Spain. He (Marquis Wellesley) had repeatedly urged in his dispatches that it would be highly dangerous to advance into Spain without such a commanding force, and such co-operation as would almost secure success; under any other circumstances it was not only disadvantageous to the cause, but it was perilous to the parties. Now, how was Lord Wellington reinforced? On the 21st of October, he thought it necessary to retire from Burgos: on the 25th he saw the French army, and we knew from his dispatches that they were greatly superior to his own forces, especially in cavalry, the most dreadful to all superiority in that country. He (Marquis Wellesley) had a right therefore to assume, that on the 25th of October, that army which Lord Wellington had conquered on the plains of Salamanca, that army which he had driven before him on that memorable day, with a grandeur of military achievement which the language of history or poetry could never equal, which imagination herself could not decorate with a splendor beyond the colouring of truth. (*Hear, hear!*) and which ranked among the most renowned generals of this or any other age (*Hear, hear, hear!*), he had a right to infer that that army had received strong and efficient reinforcements since the battle of Salamanca. Now, where was Lord Wellington's reinforcements during the same period? Scattered every where: some in port at home, some on the ocean, some landed at too great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen hundred reached him on the 24th, four days after he had begun his retreat. Where were the others? One regiment advanced as far as Benevento, and were forced to retreat again to the frontiers. Two regiments were landed at Corunna, and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where they arrived just in time, probably, to reach Lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign, certainly not much sooner (*Hear, hear, hear!*)

Such, continued the noble Marquis, was the state of the war in the Peninsula, and he would ask their Lordships whether, if the same exertions had been used by the Ministers in this country as were employed by the enemy, might not Lord Wellington have been able to prosecute to their full extent his operations against Burgos? He would now, however, call their attention for a few moments to the Sicilian expedition, as it has been denominated. He had stated that the plan of that expedition had been concerted with Lord Wellington when he was before Badajoz. In consequence of the improved fortune of our affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part of our force might be spared to co-operate with our armies in Spain; and, if it had arrived at the proper time on the south-east coast of that country, at the time when Lord Wellington fully expected it, Suchet would have been utterly unable to detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: Joseph rather must have hastened to assist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would have been of great service; but like all the rest of the system, it was imperfect exactly at that moment when it was most required to be perfect: something was done but not all; and what was done was of no use. The first division arrived in the course of June, but it was so small that it could effect nothing. Suchet, meanwhile, wrote to Joseph that he could not proceed with his whole corps, but that he sent him a reinforcement, and which reinforcement it afterwards proved, had the effect of subverting every great object of the campaign. Suchet had nothing to apprehend from the Sicilian expedition. Some time afterwards, however, (about the end of July) arrived the remainder. They appeared on the coast of Catalonia, and he was very much afraid, though he was far from intending to impute blame to any of the Commanders concerned in that expedition, that all they did was to excite the Catalonians to a demonstration of attachment to the British and Spanish cause, which led, in the result, to dreadful executions among them. It had left also, on the minds of the Catalonians, sentiments of suspicion, alienation and hatred, which it would be difficult, he apprehended, to eradicate. It was thought advisable, that this expedition should operate either at Barcelona or Tarragona, or some part intermediate: but at last they arrived where no human being could have anticipated their presence, and then became utterly extinct as to any efficient purpose to the

(Continued in the Supplement)

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(Continued from the Gazette.)

prosecution of the war. He had been told there were various ways of accounting for this indecision: at one time it was thought this place would be the best to disembark; and then another, till at last the very worst place was adopted. He had often heard that it was the greatest trial of a powerful mind to decide between two conflicting difficulties: he was sure it was the test of a weak mind, to be placed between two advantages and not to know which to choose. (*Hear, hear!*)

The feature of the present case, however, was, that both the advantages were lost and only this disadvantage gained, that a warlike and lofty province of Spain had been, as far as it was possible such true Spanish patriots could be, alienated from the Spanish cause. And what had been the ultimate result of all those proceedings? They had been told in the Speech, indeed, that the result was nothing more than the consequence of the concentration of the French armies, as if Lord Wellington's retreat was merely a military manoeuvre: and then followed that monstrous proposition, that it was favourable to the interests and resources of the Spanish nation. He hoped some explanation would be given to that assertion, for it was most injurious both to this country and to Spain. Before he could subscribe to it he must learn to think direct contradiction to every sentiment he had ever felt, and to every principle he had ever known, either from reading or experience. As the South of Spain been delivered? Did the Minister mean to say that, in point of fact, the South of Spain was not now under the dominion of France? He was perfectly satisfied that his Noble Friend, than whom he knew no man more sincerely honest, had never seen a Spanish army, as had been his the Marquis's misfortune to do. If he had, he would have known that the army of Ballasteros was utterly incapable of making any head against two such armies as Soult's and Chet's; and that Ballasteros, instead of retaining his command, would have found the materials of it vanished in an instant, when opposed to the troops of the two French Generals already mentioned.

In moving from Burgos, Lord Wellington and himself pursued by a force much superior to his, and without meaning to make any impending statements, he would ask, this being the end of the Campaign, what real progress had been made towards the great object of the contest? With regard to what was to be the object of the war in Spain, the schemes had been successively devised; the first were only talked of, and the third was settled. The first was grounded on an idea that it would be imprudent to embark as a principal in the contest, unless some other power, by its co-operation, diverted the forces of France from being all concentrated towards the one object, the subjugation of Spain. From that he had always differed in principle—but this fact was at least deducible from it, that our resources were insufficient to carry on the war upon an adequate scale, and that we must therefore await some favourable opportunity. His view of the matter had been, that we should engage as principals, and that in order to afford a chance of success in other parts of Europe, it was necessary to urge the Spanish war with vigour and effect. The second plan was, that it should be prudent and highly expedient to exert exertions upon a large scale, adequate to the destruction of the French power in Spain. Both those plans were different in principles, and yet both were consistent with their own principles. If our resources were really not adequate, then the first plan was very just and proper: but if, as he stated, we were adequate to extensive operations, the second plan was obviously the fittest.

But the plan of all others, which mankind must reprobate and reject, was the plan of employing the resources, of expending the sinews of our strength to hourly bearing hard upon our Finances, yet accomplishing neither object, but falling dead, were, between both. Such a plan as one must concur in condemning. It is essentially hostile to the principle of economy; it was expence without fruit; and that was the system which had been pursued during the last campaign, and during the preceding one (*Hear, hear!*) A vast expenditure of blood and treasure had been lavished, and our resources enfeebled, without accomplishing any one definite or precise object. It was to end he knew not; but it was to be invidious to call upon him or any one to say how closely calamity might tread in the footsteps of error (*Hear, hear!*) France was meditating fresh wars in the East of Europe, and when we saw Russia determined to resist her ambitious designs to the extremity, what more vigorous or effective assistance could we have given to Russia in prosecuting the war in Spain? The question we could give to that country,

the most essential aid that we could bestow, was by carrying on the war in Spain upon a broad and extensive scale of operations; but it was not so carried on, and he charged upon that system, therefore, in the first instance, a defection from the cause of Russia. He did not, indeed, mean to dispute that the events of the last campaign had not been beneficial to Spain, but his objection was that those benefits were imperfectly secured, and that they could not be expected to be permanent.

Adverting to the hopes held out of a diversion from Sweden, in favour of the operations of Russia, the Noble Lord animadverted upon the manner in which the Government of this Country had conducted itself, with reference to that diversion, and in all its transactions with Sweden. As it appeared to his mind, a more extraordinary act of diplomacy had never occurred than the treaty which our Ministers had concluded with the Government of Sweden. It was a treaty which promised every advantage to Sweden without guaranteeing any advantage to England. It was, in fact, a treaty in which, as it had been once observed upon a similar contract, the reciprocity was all on one side, for we had engaged to afford Sweden all the assistance in our power, in her operations against the enemy, or for her own protection, while nothing appeared likely to be done for us on her part. An expedition was expected to sail from Sweden, with a view to co-operate with Russia; but that object was soon abandoned; and in consequence of that abandonment General Victor, who, with his force, waited in Swedish Pomerania, to meet the apprehended diversion, was enabled to withdraw, and his division actually formed a part of the army with which Bonaparte made his way to Moscow. Such was the important effect of the inactivity of Sweden, and for that inactivity, so injurious to the objects of the war, it was for Ministers, in their diplomatic management with Sweden, to account. This account, indeed, they were bound, for their own justification, to produce. At a meeting which had taken place between the Emperor Alexander, Lord Cathcart and the Crown Prince of Sweden, it was understood to have been arranged, that the expedition already alluded to, was to have been dispatched from Sweden; and so cordially it seemed did Ministers enter into the project—so promptly did they determine to forward its progress, with a view to impale the army of France, that transports for the conveyance of the Swedish expedition were ordered to sail from Sheerness on the 19th of September, and Bonaparte entered Moscow on the 14th (*a laugh, and hear, hear!*) So farred this grand and much talked of expedition. What sort of explanation Ministers had it in their power to give upon this subject, he could not pretend to conjecture; but it appeared most extraordinary that after the meeting and discussion he had just mentioned, Ministers should not have been enabled to judge of the real disposition of the Crown Prince of Sweden, or that they should not have taken measures to ascertain whether any change had taken place in that disposition before the useless dispatch of the transports.

With respect to Russia, while he was fully disposed to concur in the panegyrics pronounced upon the magnanimity displayed by that power, he would ask, what assistance had our Ministers afforded to encourage the display or to aid the operation of that Magnanimity?—This he was at a loss to know, except the sending the Russians about 50,000 arms, with Lords Cathcart and Walpole, who were no doubt important instruments to aid a great empire in extricating itself from its difficulties and repelling a formidable foe.

Upon the subject of America he thought it necessary to say a few words; and first he had no hesitation in saying, that a more unjust attack was never made upon the peace of any nation than that of the American Government upon this country, nor could any cause be imagined more completely just than that which this country had to oppose to America. But he must confess that he heard with surprise the passage in the speech from the Throne, that Ministers still hoped for pacification with America; he meant with surprise, in consequence of the grounds upon which this hope was understood to rest. Nothing appeared more preposterous than the calculation that the repeal of the Orders in Council would serve to pacify America; for these Orders were never in fact the point at issue. Of the conduct of this Government throughout its discussions with that of America, he was pretty accurately informed, and he was fully prepared to defend it, especially that part of the discussion in which he was personally concerned. But he would maintain, as he had uniformly stated, that the dispute with America did not originate or rest upon the Orders in Council, but referred to higher questions, to topics deeply affecting our great maritime rights, to points, indeed, of such

importance, that according to his fullest conviction, the British Government could not concede to the pretensions of America without throwing into her hands the trident of the main (*Hear, hear!*) It would not avail Ministers to repeat the assertions of those who expressed such sanguine opinions as to the probable result of the repeal of the Orders in Council, for these assertions furnished no answer to his view of the subject. They might indeed be adduced in reference to some Noble Lords near him, from whom Ministers borrowed this measure of repeal. Yes, they abandoned their opinion upon that question, and adopted that of their adversaries, which no doubt furnished a strong proof of their vigour, firmness, and perseverance. But even with reference to those adversaries, Ministers could not now rest upon formerly expressed opinions or predictions as to the consequence to be expected from a repeal of the Orders in Council; because, although they agreed to the measure upon the advice of their adversaries, they acted upon it in an opposite spirit. They were dilatory, and apparently reluctant in the adoption of this measure of repeal, and they ought, upon various grounds, to have seen its utter inefficiency to pacify America. They ought, in fact, to have expected and been fully prepared for war with America; they ought, as Statesmen, to have known that the American Government had been long infected with a deadly hatred towards this country, and (if he might be allowed an unusual application of a word) with a deadly affection towards France. It was absurd to suppose that Governments were not as likely as individuals to be influenced by passion—that they were not more apt to act from the impulse of their own vices or corruptions than from a consideration of the interest of those over whom they preside. Therefore no statesman should or would conclude, that because it was contrary to the interest of the American people to engage in war with this country, the American Government would shrink from such a measure. Indeed in this instance no such conclusion could be deemed in the slightest degree excusable, for the disposition of the American Government was quite evident, and therefore common policy should have urged Ministers to prepare fully for the event, and Ministers should have made adequate exertions either to pacify, to intimidate, or to punish America. No means should have been unprovided effectually to repel the audacious attack which the American Government had ventured to make upon us. That attack would, he trusted, be completely avenged; that the most extensive exertions would be made to convince the American Government of its folly and desperation, and he had no doubt that the best hope of peace with that Government would rest upon the manly and vigorous employment of our resources to make it feel sensibly the consequences of war.

The only remaining topic in the speech to which he had to refer, was that with respect to India, in which he felt a peculiar interest. And here he would repeat the wish which he took occasion to express last Session, that the affairs of our Indian Empire should be fully investigated by their Lordships before any system for its future government was finally determined upon. He meant that the whole question should be brought before their Lordships, not in the shape of a bill for legislation, as it was proposed last Session, but in a distinct and separate form for deliberate inquiry, in order that it might be examined in all its details. He was happy to learn that his Noble Friend at the head of the Board of Control, was diligently employed in considering this subject, and he trusted that the result of his intelligent deliberation would be the suggestion of a course of measures, creditable to himself, honorable to this nation, advantageous to the interests of the whole empire, but above all, calculated to promote the interest and happiness of the great mass of population subject to our dominion in India. He again expressed his hope that the concerns of India should be fully discussed before an attempt was made to pass any law upon the subject.

Before he concluded, the Noble Lord felt particularly called upon to advert to an omission in the Speech which he noticed with surprise and sorrow. He was certainly surprised and sorry to perceive, that after all that had passed upon this subject—after all that had occurred in discussion, and been excited in hope, no disposition whatever was expressed to conciliate the Catholics, or to adjust their claims. It was in the recollection of their Lordships what had taken place at the close of the last session, both in that and the other House of Parliament. That in the latter indeed a distinct pledge had been entered into, fully to consider the Catholic Question, with a view to an ultimate and satisfactory arrangement. Was it now resolved to relinquish this pledge, to set aside all that had

been done? There were too many grounds of suspicion upon this subject. Recollecting the expression of the Noble Earl opposite (Liverpool), at the close of the last session, that he would oppose no barrier to the fair discussion of the Catholic claims; he could not doubt his candour, but yet he had heard of several proceedings, both in this country and in Ireland, where, to use an old phrase of Lord Camden, the hand and fingers of government were too obviously employed with a view to induce persons to capitulate upon this question. Indeed so anxious was Government considered in its hostility to the cause of the Catholics, that one cause of the dissolution of Parliament was said to be in order to get rid of the pledge of the other House upon the subject; and if the rumours afloat were well founded, that statement would appear not improbable; for according to this rumour it was the intention of Ministers, after the Houses had sat for a few days, to adjust some matters immediately necessary to their own objects, to propose an adjournment for two months. If so the practical effect of such an adjournment would be to evade the pledge for taking the Catholic Question into early consideration, which combined with the omission in the Speech, was a bad omen for the Catholics. He did not mean at present to discuss the proposed conduct of Ministers, or to cast any blame upon them, but merely to ask, and he should be glad to know precisely their intention, what was the state of the question, namely, whether all that had passed was to be regarded as gone *et nil*, and that the question was to be returned to again as a *res integra*?—There were some words, he observed, at the conclusion of the Speech, not, he presumed, as a matter of course, in praise of the Constitution. Indeed there was a report that Ministers had in contemplation to propose an extension of the duration of Parliament upon the demise of the Crown; but this praise of the Constitution, combined with the opinion he entertained of the principles of his Noble Friend at the head of the Administration, destroyed all belief in the rumour. He could not suppose it possible that his Noble Friend would for one moment entertain an opinion so fraught with alarm, and so incapable of excuse upon any pretence of utility or convenience. No, he was sure his Noble Friend had too much reverence for the ancient Monarchical Parliamentary Constitution of the country, to meditate upon such an innovation as might lead to the most pernicious consequences—to consequences, indeed, which, from the recently disturbed state of the public mind, he could not, he must confess, contemplate without dismay. But to return to the panegyric which the Speech contained upon the Constitution, let us hope that it did not imply any hostile reference to the Catholic cause.

The Noble Lord, after recapitulating the several heads of his argument, concluded with expressing his opinion, that increased exertions must be made to strengthen our army in the Peninsula, or it would be cruel towards ourselves and our allies to continue the contest—to persevere in an useless effusion of blood and expenditure of money. For without additional strength, he was persuaded that the object of the war could not be attained, and that the continuance of the struggle, instead of being advantageous to this country, to Spain, or to the Continent, would have a directly different operation.

Lord Liverpool replied, at considerable length, to the statements and reasoning of the Noble Marquis, and vindicated the conduct of Ministers, who were ready to submit the whole of their conduct to the strictest scrutiny, whether referring to the civil or military government of the country—whether referring to disaster or to triumph—whether furnishing matter for congratulation, or events to deplore. To look for unmixed success, or exemption from misfortune in a state of war, would indeed be chimerical. But he trusted that where misfortune occurred, the mind of Parliament and the public was too considerate and just, not to distinguish between that which was attributable to the contingencies of war, which resulted from inevitable circumstances, and that for which Ministers or their agents might be deemed fairly responsible. With regard to the war in the Peninsula, the Noble Lord repeated the opinion which he expressed at the outset. The war in Spain he regarded as a new era, because in that case the people were most active in repelling their invaders. Unlike the people of Germany and Italy, who were passive spectators of the conflict produced by French invasion, the Spaniards were most forward to contend for the independence and old establishments of their country: therefore their cause held out an encouraging prospect, and a good example, which the people of Russia were now so nobly emulating. It was this exhibition of a high national spirit which originally induced him to become an



advocate for those measures of assistance which the Spaniards had received from this country. Indeed, if this country had not afforded that aid, it would, in his judgment, have betrayed an indifference, not only to every high sentiment of liberty, but every, even the most common notions of policy. But while his object was to assist Spain, to afford to the Spanish people and to Europe the means of profiting by the circumstances which appeared so promising, he was certainly not so sanguine as many others who concurred with him as to the policy of granting the assistance. Whatever the result, he thought it the duty of England to make an attempt in favour of Spain. Then as to the question of amount in the aid to be afforded, and also whether the aid were equal to the end, he could say, as to the first, that the utmost had been done for Spain, which, consistently with a due attention to other objects, it was possible for Government to do. It was for those who maintained the contrary to shew how and where more might have been done. As to the equality of our means to the end in view, our gallant Commander in the Peninsula had never been deceived by Government as to the means in its power to afford, nor had any aid that officer required ever been refused. It would be, indeed, an injustice to him and to the country to deceive him on such points. Then considering the subject in all its bearings, how could any blame be imputable to Ministers? He admitted, that at the period when the French army were so engaged with Russia, the opportunity might be more favourable for a distinguished effort in the Peninsula, but considering the uncertainty of war, and the responsibility of Government for the perpetual protection and safety of the empire, he would ask, whether it would be consistent with its duty, for one extraordinary effort, to throw away the means of future exertion; that knowing the most brilliant campaign has often no decisive influence upon the fate of war, whether a wise Government should cast all on one die—should hazard the main power, the heart's blood of a country, merely to make a flourish—to risk perpetual strength for the peculiar triumph of one year? But when the assertion was made that more ought to have been done for the Peninsula, he would beg the House to consider and compare, and for the purpose of comparison, to look to the most brilliant periods of our history—to the periods of King William and Queen Anne, and the great Duke of Marlborough. Let all the relative circumstances be fairly taken into view, and he would challenge the comparison. For what was the actual state of our force in that quarter, which the Noble Marquis had said was so inadequately supplied? Why, that we had, on the 25th of June last, in the Peninsula and the Mediterranean, an army of no less than 127,000 men in our pay; that is 91,000 British, including foreign or German troops, with 36,000 Portuguese. Such was our force, independently of Spanish auxiliaries, which received from us all the assistance in our power, in formation, equipment, and pecuniary supply. Nay, the British army alone, under the command of Lord Wellington, at the period alluded to, amounted to 68,000. Now he would appeal to their Lordships whether the exertion which had collected such an army deserved to be characterised in such terms as the House had heard from the Noble Marquis; but more he would ask, whether three years ago any man in England could have been so sanguine as to imagine the collection of such an army practicable? Yet such had been the exertions of that Government, which had also to provide for the protection of India, of our numerous colonies in the West, and for our home defence. Then as to our supplies to our American colonies, which the Noble Marquis professed to think that Ministers had left almost wholly unprepared; now the fact was, that from the 25th of December last to the present, no less than 20,000 men, with 7,000 horses had been sent to that quarter. As to deficiency of equipment among our army, Bonaparte, who did not hesitate to take by force the means of equipping his soldiery, wherever he found them, had often felt such deficiency, while with us who paid liberally for all articles, there was rarely any such complaints. But that our soldiers should be quite secure from privations, that they should at all times be completely equipped, it would be too much to expect in the ordinary vicissitudes of war. Where, however, such privations occurred—where they were reported by our illustrious Commander, his regulations were immediately attended to—indeed they were always complied with. This could and would, no doubt, be confirmed promptly by that distinguished Commander himself. For it was a striking feature in his character, that he was as just to those who served him, as he was bold to those who opposed him—and it was another striking feature in his character, that he was never extravagant in his expectations or demands—indeed he was never likely to make such demands, because Ministers took care that he should be always accurately informed as to the means of supply.—That no inconvenience might have been felt from the state of the military chest, he was not prepared to deny, as the supply of specie at present must depend upon such a variety of circumstances, out of the power of any Ministers to controul; upon the means of obtain-

ing money for bills upon the continent, and other causes, particularly the state of the Spanish colonies in America, which naturally interfered with the importation of bullion. But here again no blame could attach to Government, for nothing practicable was left undone by them. There was, however, a limit to their means, as there is a limit to the means of any nation; by that limit alone Government was confined in its struggles to assist these operations which the Noble Marquis called upon them to extend. But whether they could so extend, he would be ready, at any time, to discuss with the Noble Marquis, with whom the *onus* would lie to shew where the resources for such extended operation could be found.

As to the Sicilian expedition he stated, that it was prepared to sail early in March, and conducted throughout in concert with Lord Wellington, who communicated regularly with the Commander of that expedition. The appearance of this expedition off Catalonia, was, he was assured, of great utility, as it prevented Suchet from sending reinforcements to Joseph Bonaparte, who in consequence evacuated Madrid, and the arrival of the expedition at Valencia, instead of being a mistake, as asserted, was the result of plan and orders.

That the late campaign had succeeded, he was prepared to prove. For what was the plan of the campaign—why the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz—the expulsion of the French from the South of Spain, and the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and all these objects had been attained; and would not that man have been deemed very sanguine, who at the outset would predict the attainment of such important objects, particularly the setting free of the Spanish Government by the raising of the siege of Cadiz? In stating that the objects of the campaign had been gained, he would not deny, that many of the hopes excited by the victory of Salamanca, had been disappointed. But that disappointment was not attributable to any want of energy on the part of his Majesty's Government; nor was the conduct or scarcity of artillery at Burgos, so much dwelt upon by the Noble Marquis as any imputation upon Government; for the fact was, there were three battering trains on the Continent; and, besides these, one was sent last March to Lisbon, to be kept aloft, subject to the opinion, however, of the Noble Lord himself, Burgos must have been taken, if at all, without delay, before any artillery could be brought to him.—But the failure of our gallant Commander's calculation, and the consequent re-capture of Madrid, was owing to the refusal of Ballasteros to obey his commands; which refusal facilitated the movements of the French forces, and discovered Lord Wellington's plan of operations.

Upon the subject of Sweden he could not, from considerations of state delicacy, say much in reply to the Noble Marquis, but thus much he could state, that the most perfect confidence prevailed between the Governments of Russia, Sweden and this country, and that nothing dissatisfactory had taken place in the transaction alluded to by the Noble Marquis. As to the story about the transports, he could only assure the House that he never heard of such a thing before this evening.

Adverting to America, the Noble Lord begged the Noble Marquis before he again applied the insignificance of a repeal of the Orders in Council, in the estimation of the American Government, to recollect the dispatches of that Government, and his own dispatches also which he seemed to forget. But above all, he would call to the recollection of the Noble Marquis the act of the American Congress, distinctly proclaiming, that the Non-importation Act should be repealed as soon as the repeal of our Orders in Council should take place. As soon as that very measure should be adopted which the Noble Marquis now insists the Americans regarded as insignificant. When, however, the Noble Marquis asserted that we were unprepared for the American war, he would ask him to point out where and how we were unprepared? Were we unprepared in Canada, or was there any neglect at the Admiralty? He was prepared to discuss this question with the Noble Marquis; and on this subject, as well as with respect to Spain, he would beg the Noble Marquis to come to close quarters—to state facts—to bring something specific, and abandon that style of loose and general accusation, of which the House had heard so much in the course of this discussion.—Now, as to the concluding topic of the Noble Marquis's Speech, I have not, said Lord L. made use of any expression with respect to the Catholic question, to which I do not adhere.—My opinion I have always publicly proclaimed upon this subject. I have resisted, and I will resist, the proposition for entering into the consideration of the Catholic claims, because I cannot see my way to any adjustment of those claims, likely to satisfy the Catholics. I therefore think it more consistent to oppose the proposition at once, than seek to defeat it by what are called guards or securities. I meet the Catholics openly and publicly, and will never attempt to disappoint wishes by any little underhand opposition—by any schemes of subterfuge. My system of opposition I feel to be more fair and candid, and therefore I will continue to pursue it. In stating this to

my intention, I declare merely my individual opinion, without meaning to affect the judgment, or bind the purpose of any of my Friends.

Lord Grenville rose in reply to the Earl of Liverpool, and we regret that the lateness of the hour prevents us from doing that justice to the Noble Baron's speech, to which it was so justly entitled; for in sound sense, Statesmanlike views, and solid argument, it was equal to any thing which we remember to have heard from his Lordship on former occasions. He began by complimenting his Noble Friend (Lord Wellesley) and characterised the answer, which a Noble Earl (Lord Liverpool) made to the speech of his Noble Friend, as feeble, inconclusive and foolish. His Noble Friend's views were justified both by the speech from the Throne, and still more fully by the Noble Earl's (Lord Liverpool's) reply. Lord Grenville proceeded to state, that he did not deny, or disavow, some words attributed to him by the Noble Lord (Liverpool). These words he had used on former occasions; but, so far was he from thinking them wrong, that he thought he was, this night, fully justified in the use of them, by what had been spoken on both sides of the House. He could not but condemn the general replies of the Noble Earl (Liverpool)—(hear, hear, hear!)—in which he was so fond of dealing upon most occasions; whilst the speech of the Noble Marquis (Wellesley) in which he pointed out the definitive object we ought to have in view in the campaign in the Peninsula, whilst it abounded, like every thing that fell from his Noble Friend, in Statesmanlike principles and details, met with his highest commendation.—(Hear, hear!)—That one ultimate object, stated by his Noble Friend (Wellesley) deserved, and had his approbation.—Whilst the Noble Earl's comment on the subject of that definitive object, was general, imperfect and desultory. When we engaged first in the Peninsula war, the question was not then what it is at present.—It was not then as at present, a question in which all Europe was concerned and engaged; for now all the armies of Europe are, or have been lately engaged against this country. The allusions made by the Noble Earl (Liverpool) to the period of King William and Queen Anne were without analogy and inconclusive. As to his own former observations and reasonings, they had reference to a different state of France, in which she had not such a union of all Europe to support her. He was of opinion, that it was only when we saw a powerful embodied army on the Continent belonging to our allies, that we ought to put forth our exertions; and that we ought to assist our continental allies only as auxiliaries, not as principals. No diversion had been made in concert with Lord Wellington, where it ought to have been made, unless we could call that one which was made in the Fens of Walcheren.—(Hear, hear, hear!)—His Noble Friend (Lord Wellesley) had well stated, that the Ministry had not as yet advanced one step in their object in the Spanish war. Nor must the Noble Earl (Liverpool) think, that he has answered his Noble Friend (Lord Wellesley) when he states the number of our troops on the Continent, or when he makes a boast of having delivered Andalusia from the French. The spirit of the Spanish Peasantry was good, but there was none in the Spanish Nobility. The reasons assigned by the Noble Marquis (Wellesley) for the failure of the campaign were the true ones: not those stated by the Earl of Liverpool, who confessed that he always expected co-operation from the Spaniards. Were he in the Noble Earl's situation, he would rather confess the inadequacy of his policy, than come forward and say, at the end of the year,—O dear! we expected such things, but we have been disappointed.—(Hear, hear!) If they had, as they boasted, 130,000 men on the Continent, why was there so little done, when the expence was so great?—or why were 20,000 British troops kept idle in Sicily? Were the measures of his friend (Earl Grey), in 1807, adopted, that would have prevented the necessity of locking up such a force in Sicily. But their non-adoption could not create surprise; as it now is pretty well understood, that an epigram caused these men to be kept in Sicily, when they ought to have been in Spain. (Hear, hear!) But, with regard to Spain, Ministry were always too late; and the Noble Earl (Liverpool) was obliged to recur to his last and usual defence—the abuse of his agent, whom he charges with the failure of the co-operation from Sicily, which was expected by Lord Wellington. But to prevent that failure, the army of Sicily ought to have been put under the immediate command of Lord Wellington.

Although 105 millions or more, by estimate, are to be raised this year, yet the Noble Earl confesses his inability to supply the military chest of Lord Wellington. The difficulty, however, does not arise from the deficient resources of the country, much as they have been drained, but must be traced to the Noble Earl's (Liverpool's) real inefficiency, and to that of his colleagues. They may diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country, with as little effect, or prospect of ultimate success, as they have had in those plans and speculations which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency in paper and in coin throughout the nation; when such have been its effects, why

test in Spain? The Noble Baron then proceeded to compliment his friend (Lord Wellesley) who did not, like the Noble Earl (Liverpool), condescend to deal in loose principles, vague analogies, or in general assertions, but went on reasoning point by point, as full of facts as he was of sound theoretical principles, and of practical political wisdom. As his Majesty's Minister had not made sufficient disclosures, he did not wish to press them at present with respect to our connections with Sweden. But he may say, that much might have been done there, although but little has been effected.

The Ministers were foolish in expecting that the repeal of the Orders in Council when that took place, could have produced conciliation in America. But there was time when it would have had that effect. The Noble Earl (Liverpool) has yet, and I flatter myself, that his stamp will always have learned, that concessions made too late always produce irritation.—(Hear, hear, hear!)—It was so with regard to Ireland as well as to America. The details brought to light relative to the condition of our manufactures ought to have convinced Ministers, that the repeal of the Orders in Council, when it took place, could not have produced a spirit of pacification in America—although two months before it might have had that effect. The American Government were always hostile, but had not the means of shewing their hostility sooner. But now they display their spirit, when our Government have, by the means in their power, particularly by disclosure of the condition of our manufactures; for this it is that has given spirit to America. Had Government no other reason for such a measure, they ought to have conciliated America sooner, for the purpose of making more vigorous exertions in Spain. We are as yet ignorant of the circumstances which led to the American war, for the matter is still kept a secret; and he could not but blame the omission of this cause in speech from the throne. He knew, that there were perverse irritations on both sides, though he wished for peace with America, was only on such terms as would be consistent with the preservation of our maritime rights without which he would prefer the continuance of the war with that country. The last point on which Lord Grenville commented, was the declarations made by the Noble Earl (Liverpool) on the Catholic Claims. His marks were not able to catch distinctions, nor shall we attempt to sketch them present, for fear of deviating into misstatement or error.

Lord Bathurst said, with respect to force from Sicily, the fact was, that William Bentinck had instructions to send such a number of troops as was consistent with the other objects to which he looked. The objection that by the force from thence not remaining in Catalonia, Baron D'Erolles was disgusted, had no more in it, since that period, (as has appeared by the Gazette) our naval force had been in active co-operation with the D'Erolles. With regard to the charge of not sending reinforcements to the Marquis of Wellington, the fact was, that in the month of June Lord Wellington sent a patch requesting, unless some extraordinary circumstance occurred, that no new troops might be sent out to him, because they were more likely to be affected by the summer. It was, therefore, that no new troops were sent, until intelligence had been received of the battle of Salamanca, which was considered that extraordinary circumstance required reinforcements to be sent: respect to the United States of America, he contended that the conduct of Ministers had been throughout consistent.

The Marquis Wellesley said, he had no personal attack, and therefore he did not expect any personal attack to be made him. He should only now say that he did not think the Peninsula was adequately fortified, and therefore he resigned. He could not state, without the permission of his Majesty, or the Prince Regent, on the behalf of his Majesty; but if he had the opportunity, he should be ready to meet the Noble Lord, point by point, upon the subject, either in public or private, and any tribunal to which he might be summoned.

Lord Viscount Melville stated, with respect to the naval force upon the American station, that at the time of the declaration of war there were ships at Halifax not double the whole number of the American navy, besides those at Jamaica and the West India Islands. He therefore contended that there was no neglect on the part of Ministers, and that the capture of the Guerriere was an accident that could not be guarded against.

Lord Grenville said, he did not blame the neglecting of Ministers as to charge the neglecting to provide a naval force to the American navy, which only consisted of five frigates. His charge was, that they did not send sufficient reinforcements, and that our military force in America was, in consequence, inferior to the assailants.

The address was then agreed to be presented to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. Adjourned at twelve o'clock.







